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Abstract 
Starting from the influential Western tradition of constructing "Asia" and the 
"Asians" as distinctively different from "Europe" and the "Europeans," the author 
discusses how theories about the "self" have proven to be constitutive for culture-
specific understandings of the self and the other in one's own and in foreign 
societies. By contrasting some of the main characteristics of "Western" views of 
Asians with Hindu and Buddhist theories about the self, he then shows how the 
tendency to construct "Asians" as distinct others has resulted in many Western 
scholars' failure a) to understand key aspects of Indian self-theories and b) to do 
justice to the vast spectrum of traditions of Indian and Asian thought that do not 
conceive of Asia as a more or less homogenous cultural sphere. Finally, the 
author discusses how a more thorough analysis of intercultural and intracultural 
self-theories can shed light on the crucial sociological and psychological role 
such theories can play in the history and politics of intercultural encounters as 
well as on the factors involved in India's and other society's ongoing effort to 
achieve a collective identity. 
摘要 
本文首先談及具有影響力的西方傳統建構出「亞洲」和「亞洲人」，
以與「歐洲」和「歐洲人」明顯區分。接著討論就以文化為特定對象的理
解而言，與「自我」相關的理論已被證明乃是瞭解自己本身社會與異國社
會中的「自我」與「他者」的組成要素。然後將「西方人」對亞洲人觀點
中的某些主要特徵與印度教和佛教有關「自我」的理論兩相對比，並且說
明將「亞洲人」建構成截然不同的「他者」的傾向如何導致許多西方學者
既無法了解印度諸種有關「自我」理論的關鍵層面，又不能欣賞印度與亞
洲思想傳統的浩瀚，不能理解亞洲是一個大體上同質的文化領域。最後，
則討論到為何更進一步透徹分析文化間與文化內部有關「自我」的理論可
以彰顯社會學與心理學的重要角色：這些理論可能在文化之間彼此邂逅的
歷史及政治上扮演要角，同時可能成為影響印度與其他社會持續努力達到
集體認同的因素。 
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Introductory Remark 
In the following, I will present key features of Western thinking about the 
alleged "Asian self" and compare it to prominent Indian (specifically, Hindu and 
Buddhist) thinking about the idea of a self. I will then discuss how prominent 
Indian thinking has affected the way Indians see other Asians and how they see 
the "other" within their own society and, more generally, how an indigenous 
perspective on Indian self-theories offers an exemplary account of Asian self-
concepts which is different from that constructed in the "West's" view of the 
"East." I will try to show that the discussion about the idea of an individual and a 
collective self, or about any personal or cultural identity, can hardly be 
undertaken without reflecting on the intercultural, intracultural, sociopolitical, 
and historical characteristics of the discussion. 
Asia as Europe's "Other" 
The term "Asia" is a toponym whose origins are not perfectly clear, but that 
was mainly used in Ancient Greece and Rome in order to refer to the vast regions 
and numerous peoples East of Europe using a single collective term that played a 
considerable role in the self-construction of Europe. It has always been Asia or 
the "East," that was considered the "other" dominant sphere worth mentioning. 
The East was the realm of mighty powers and enemies who more than once 
appeared at and even crossed the European borders. Asia therefore served as the 
counterfoil Europeans used in order to construct their cultural self-understanding. 
That did not change when Europe discovered the Americas, which was simply 
treated as a European extension, i.e., Europe's own Far West. The attitude 
towards the East has always been (and even today remains) a specific blend of 
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admiration, contempt, and fear. As a result, very different ethnic and cultural 
groups such as the Afghans, Arabs, Chinese, Indians, Indonesians, Japanese, 
Koreans, Persians, Turks, etc., all became "Asians," actually meaning "non-
Europeans" or "non-Christians." This can clearly be seen in the context of what is 
termed "Orientalism," the Eurocentric discourse about the "Orient," analyzed by 
Edward Said and many others: For some Western intellectuals and scholars, 
namely, the so-called "Orientalists," the "Orient" meant the Near East, mainly 
Turkey, the Arabian and Muslim regions as well as northern parts of Africa; for 
others the Orient stretched much further to the East, including India, Southeast 
Asia, and the even more distant regions that are called "East Asia" today, namely 
China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Thus, for millennia, the European view of the 
East resulted in an abstraction of Asia, making the largest, most populated and 
extremely diverse continent a quite homogenous region that could thus be easily 
contrasted to the "West." 
This simplification laid the ground for many other simplifications, including 
the introduction into Western scientific approaches of various dichotomous 
concepts for differentiating between Westerners and Easterners, between 
Europeans and Asians, between Christians and non-Christians. Probably the best 
known of these concepts is the differentiation between individualistic and 
collectivistic societies, which has been an academic theme in Europe since 
antiquity and gained special prominence in the individual-centered view of man 
held by thinkers of the European Renaissance.1 The theme has been greatly 
influencing social scientific research for some decades now, ever since Geert 
Hofstede re-introduced the individualism-collectivism differentiation in his 
famous cross-cultural comparison of about 40 countries in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.2 The number of countries and subjects have increased since then as 
                                                 
1 Cigdem Kagitçibasi, "Individualism and Collectivism," in J. Berry, M. H. Segall, & C. 
Kagitçibasi (eds.), Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology, Vol. 3 (Boston, MA: Allyn & 
Bacon, 1996, 2nd ed.), pp. 1-49. 
2 For more detailed information on his theory, see Geert Hofstede, Culture's Consequences: 
Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations (Thousand Oaks, 
The Indian Self and the Others: Individual and Collective Identities in India         5 
v 
have the number of scientific concepts that draw upon Hofstede's distinction. For 
example, in order to refer to the psychological outcomes of an individualistic or 
collectivistic orientation within societies on the personal level, Triandis 
introduced the differentiation between ideocentric vs. allocentric tendencies and 
Markus and Kitayama contrasted the independent and interdependent self.3 
These and similar theories again draw upon the broader differentiation between 
Westerners and Easterners (especially US Americans and East Asians) and make 
use of additional bipolar concepts like autonomy vs. relatedness, separation vs. 
connectedness, high vs. low self-monitoring, high vs. low context dependence, 
stability vs. instability, individual orientation vs. group orientation, etc. In short, 
the oversimplified construction of Asia as Europe's other has had an undeniable 
yet surprising effect on social scientific comparisons of cultures and their 
conceptualizations of the so-called self. We should note that in most of the 
concepts just mentioned, the attributes of a stable, independent, and autonomous 
self are usually related to Westerners, while attributes deficient in these qualities 
are usually related to Easterners.4 G. F. W. Hegel was only one of many leading 
European thinkers of the 18th and 19th century who viewed these alleged 
psychological deficits as a source of societal deficits, claiming that the failure of 
Asian intellectuals to come up with the idea of a stable and autonomous self of 
the Western kind was to blame for their failure to build modern, clearly defined, 
stable, and autonomous nation-states like those in Europe.5 
From most Asians' perspective, the assessment of who they are and what 
constitutes their identity was and still is different. The Asians themselves never 
                                                                                                                         
 
CA: Sage, 2000, 2nd ed.). 
3 See Harry C. Triandis, Individualism & Collectivism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); 
Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, "Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, 
Emotion, and Motivation," Psychological Review, 98 (1991), pp. 224-253. 
4 Pradeep Chakkarath, "Stereotypes in Social Psychology: The 'West-East' Differentiation as a 
Reflection of Western Traditions of Thought," Psychological Studies, 55 (2010), pp. 18-25. 
5 G. F. W. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, H. B. Nisbet (trans.) (Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press, 1975; Original work published 1832-1848). 
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gave much consideration to the idea of a collective Asia, mainly because they 
never saw themselves as a geographical or ethnic unity. In their perspective, they 
have always been extremely varied groups, even within the same territories and 
societies. For example, interestingly enough, when it comes to cultural and 
national identity formation, India and China, two of the most influential Asian 
civilizations for most of history, did not show much interest in contrasting 
themselves with the "West" as vice versa. It is also interesting that India and 
China, though they were superpowers at various phases of history, never engaged 
in an exploration of the West and also never undertook a West-oriented 
missionary effort that could be compared to the role that exploration and mission 
played in the history and self-understanding of Europe. 
In the following, though, in the history and the discourses of the sciences 
these terms have been used differently and with varying meanings, for the 
purpose of this article, I will not deem it necessary to differentiate sharply 
between them, but consider them as terms with a strong family resemblance that 
help convey my point. 
Indian Conceptions of the Self 
Max Mueller, one of the most recognized Western indologists, famously 
stated that if he was asked "under what sky the human mind has most full 
developed some of its choicest gifts, has most deeply pondered on the greatest 
problems of life, and has found solutions of some of them which well deserve the 
attention even of those who have studied Plato and Kant," he should point to 
India.6 Though this statement found and still finds much support by many other 
European scholars, too, only a few of them will be leading representatives of 
                                                 
6 Friedrich Max Mueller, India: What Can it Teach Us? (New York, NY: Funk & Wagnalls, 
1883), p. 24. 
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academic Western philosophy and even fewer will be Western academic 
psychologists. At first glance, this is surprising for at least five reasons: First, the 
different classical schools of Indian philosophy have touched upon almost any 
topic that Western philosophy has been interested in; second, Indian philosophical 
and psychological contributions have always focused on the mutual relationship 
between cognition processes and the development of an individual self and 
pondered on themes that have been at the core of fundamental scientific 
discourse in Europe, e.g., in Freud's psychoanalysis or in symbolic interactionism 
as introduced by G. H. Mead, Blumer, and Cooley; third, the respective analyses 
resulted in some of the earliest systematized intervention and therapeutic 
measures, of which the systems of yoga and ayurveda are only two but may be 
the best known to the West; fourth, much of India's philosophical and 
psychological thought has been tightly linked to social philosophy and the reality 
of Indian society and has frequently served as legitimization for upholding key 
convictions about social status and duties, including the belief in the adequacy of 
the Hindu caste system; fifth, for many centuries, key elements of Indian 
philosophy, psychology, and society had a far-reaching influence on the 
development of cultures and societies outside the Indian subcontinent, mainly in 
Southeast but also in East Asia. 
In other words, there would be a sufficient number of scientific reasons for 
Western moral and social sciences, especially for sociologists and psychologists, 
to show considerably more interest in the Indian contributions to their own fields 
of interest. However, until recently – with very few exceptions like Max Weber's 
efforts7 to integrate the above-mentioned aspects into his theory about the 
meaning of world views for the development of societies – non-Western thought, 
including the vast corpus of Indian intellectuality, has mainly been treated as pre-
scientific, metaphysical, and/or irrational. Since I have tried to show the 
ethnocentric sources and the inadequacy of this Western attitude towards non-
                                                 
7 See Max Weber, Religion of India: The sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism (New Delhi, 
India: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2004; Original work published 1916-1918). 
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Western thinking elsewhere,8 in the following, I will restrict my line of thought 
to a presentation of some fundamental aspects of Indian theories about the self 
without meticulously arguing for or defending their scientific merit. Here, I will 
emphasize their cultural psychological meaning for the socialization context of 
more than a billion people in and outside of India, namely, for so-called Asians. 
As mentioned above, India developed various traditions of thought and, of 
course, here it would be impossible to do justice to the richness of the different 
schools and contents of the theories that resulted from their approaches, analyses, 
and commentaries. The intellectual discourses they reflect can be traced back to 
oral and written accounts that stretch over the last 4000 years or so and constitute 
one of the most extensive, manifold, and continuous scholarly traditions of 
mankind. Contrary to a misleading perception by many Western commentators, 
these traditions cannot be reduced to mere spiritualism, idealism, and nihilism,9 
but also include theories of materialism, atomism, rationalism, empiricism, 
realism, pragmatism, among others. So even if I focus my portrayal of some key 
features of these traditions on so-called "Hindu" and "Buddhist" contributions, I 
am not implying that Jainist, Islamic, Sikhist, animalistic, and other traditions are 
not worth mentioning in this context. On the contrary, I want to emphasize that 
Hindu and Buddhist scholars refined many of their own theories as a result of 
century-long debates with all these traditions. However, the following focus on 
Hindu and Buddhist contributions to self-theory may be justified by a) the fact 
that over 80 percent of India's population are still being raised in the Hindu 
tradition and in Hindu socialization contexts, that b) the traditions of Hinduism 
and Buddhism have been influenced by each other more than by other traditions 
and for a longer period of time, and that c) it is these two intellectual traditions 
                                                 
8 See Pradeep Chakkarath, "Internationalizing Education and the Social Sciences: Reflections on 
the Indian Context," in M. Kuhn & D. Weidemann (eds.), Internationalization of the Social 
Sciences: Asia – Latin America – Middle East – Africa – Eurasia (Bielefeld, Germany: Transcript, 
2010), pp. 87-114; "Stereotypes in Social Psychology: The 'West-East' Differentiation as a 
Reflection of Western Traditions of Thought," Psychological Studies, 55 (2010), pp. 18-25. 
9 See Pradeep Chakkarath, "The stereotyping of India: Spirituality, Bollywood, and the Kamasutra," 
SIETAR Journal, 1 (2007), pp. 4-7. 
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that influenced the regions East of India the most. Of course, what follows is only 
a very brief sketch of Indian conceptions of the self. However, I hope it will 
convey some of the main features of Indian self-theory.10 
Though there are manifold variations in regional practices and related 
differences in the role that Hindu beliefs play in everyday life, there are central 
tenets that are shared by almost everyone raised in the Hindu tradition. One of 
these central tenets is the belief in brahman ("universal soul"), the all-
encompassing life force that embodies all aspects of existence and which is 
reflected in atman ("individual self"), the life force that makes any living being 
part of brahman. It is the core conviction of Hindu believers that not 
understanding the relationship between brahman and atman is deeply 
problematic and that ignorance of the true nature of this relationship results in 
suffering which is considered the underlying principle of all existence. These 
problems arise especially from the nature of the individual self and the 
psychological processes that cause its development. In other words, it is mainly 
due to processes within the human psyche that the individual develops the 
conviction that he is a unique and separate entity, in principle unrelated to the rest 
of the world which he sees as the "other" sphere of life. Thus, the individual 
constructs an opposition between himself and the world instead of recognizing 
that all beings and things and phenomena of the world, including himself, are 
reflections of one and the same, i.e., brahman. This ignorance is the source of 
egoism – i.e., unawareness of the interrelatedness and interdependence of all 
                                                 
10 For a more detailed discussion, see Agehananda Bharati, "The Self in Hindu Thought and 
Action," in A. J. Marsella, G. Devos, & F. L. K. Hsu (eds.), Culture and Self: Asian and Western 
Perspectives (London, UK: Tavistockpp, 1985), pp. 185-230; Pradeep Chakkarath, "What Can 
Western Psychology Learn from Indigenous Psychologies? Lessons from Hindu Psychology," 
in W. Friedlmeier, P. Chakkarath & B. Schwarz (eds.), Culture and Human Development: The 
Importance of Cross-Cultural Research to the Social Sciences (New York, NY: Psychology 
Press, 2005), pp. 31-51; Pradeep Chakkarath, "Indian Thoughts on Psychological Human 
Development," in G. Misra (ed.), Psychology and Psychoanalysis in India (New Delhi, India: 
Sage, in press); Jonardon Ganeri, The Concealed Art of the Soul: Theories of Self and Practices 
of Truth in Indian Ethics and Epistemology (New York; NY: Oxford University Press, 2007); 
Anand C. Paranjpe, Self and Identity in Modern Psychology and Indian Thought (New York, 
NY: Plenum, 1998). 
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existing things – and results in selfish behavior, driven by uninhibited emotions, 
greed, the need for a diversified and adventurous life, etc. Since these kinds of 
desires and needs constitute the basis for failure, disappointment, frustration, 
aggression, shame, and many other negative states, it follows that the 
psychological processes that lead to this fateful condition of selfishness need to 
be analyzed, understood, and controlled. Otherwise – that is another central 
conviction in the Hindu belief system – the selfish actions and behavior will 
result in a cycle of endless death and rebirth (samsara). As the driving force 
behind the process of samsara, Hindus identify the accumulated sum total of the 
individual's good and bad deeds which they relate to the universal law of karma. 
The concept of karma can be conceived of as similar to the law of gravity that, 
metaphorically speaking, "weighs" and "judges" the qualities of matter and 
decides its velocity, direction, and place in the universe. It is a fundamental 
assumption in this theory that, like matter, psychological phenomena, too, are 
subject to natural laws. The natural law of karma is believed to evaluate one's 
moral behavior as "good" if one lives according to the cosmic law of being 
(dharma). Since dharma is understood as the representation of a just world which 
attributes a precisely defined place and function to everyone and everything, each 
Hindu must follow certain rules and fulfill specific duties, recognizing that 
selfishness will only harm that order. This code of conduct which constitutes the 
Hindu way of life involves doing what is right for the individual, the family, the 
caste (jati), the society, and the cosmic order. The rules of conduct have been laid 
down in various dharma shastras, compilations of laws that help one to give 
practical meaning to the theoretical aspects mentioned above and thus show that, 
from a Hindu point of view, there is no real difference between the religious and 
the social spheres. This becomes even clearer in the conviction that not only one's 
membership in a particular caste, but even the biological and social conditions of 
one's life – whether one ends up being a plant, an animal, a demon, or a human 
being, male or female, attractive or unattractive, or more or less intelligent – are 
decisively influenced by one's conduct in one's previous life. Thus, the whole 
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belief system is metaphysically legitimized, which makes it possible for anyone 
to perceive social reality as just, an interpretation which has helped stabilize the 
Hindu society and the caste system for thousands of years. 
Here, we should note that – contrary to Hegel's and many other Western 
thinkers' opinions – the metaphysically induced, psychological pressure put on 
the Hindu to take care of his psyche actually results in stability, not diffusion. 
One can easily recognize the importance of a stable self within the Hindu self-
theory in the idea of rebirth: The atman concept provides that there are core 
aspects of the individual self that stay unchanged through all rebirths. One could 
say that, according to this theory, the immortal core identity of a person is 
provided by a kind of matrix into which the sum total of his karma is entered 
from birth to birth. This core identity ensures that much of the responsibility for 
the current life as well as for the preceding existences can be attributed to the 
individual himself. In addition, we should note that following a rigid normative 
system of rules and fulfilling one's spiritual as well as social duties does not 
result in world-renunciation – as, for example, Max Weber characterized the Hindu 
attitude towards reality – but in commitment to worldly things that need to be 
taken care of for the sake of the societal and cosmic order. 
Though the Buddhist belief system has maintained various elements of the 
Hindu framework (e.g., the idea of suffering as the fundamental principle of all 
being, the concept of karma as well as the belief in samsara and karma-
dependent rebirth), there are crucial differences, especially when it comes to the 
conception of the self. From early on, Buddhism rejected the idea of an immortal 
core self (atman) that provides personal identity through all transmigrations. 
Similar to the Hindu self-theory, the Buddhist theory of the non-self (anatman) is 
closely related to psychological theories of cognition. 
The Buddhist theory of cognition and self is based on a detailed analysis of 
the psychophysical condition of humans, which is believed to be empirically 
12          Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Issue 14), Dec. 2010 
xii 
examinable by anyone through systematic and regularly executed meditation 
exercises, which play an important role in the Buddhist way of life. With respect 
to contents as well as abstraction and systematization level, these analyses rank 
among the most important psychological contributions of Asian thinking. I can 
only describe them here very briefly.11 At the core of the analyses is the view 
that a person or one's "I consciousness" is collectively constituted by the five 
"aggregates" (skandha): 1) physical form (rupa), which includes the four 
elements, earth (solidity), water (liquidity), fire (temperature), and wind (expansion); 
2) sensations and feelings (vedana): unpleasant, pleasant, or neutral sensations 
that stem from contact between the six internal sensory organs (eyes, nose, ears, 
tongue, body, and mind) and the corresponding external objects (appearance, 
smell, sound, taste, touch, and mental object); 3) perceptions (sanna): the 
perception of appearance, smell, sound, taste, physical form, and spirit; 4) 
volitional formations (sankhara), from which the six expressions of will emerge, 
which can be directed toward all of the sensations and perceptions specified 
above; 5) consciousness (vinnana), consisting of consciousness of the six sensory 
organs and the external objects assigned to them. 
Humans are thus described as an aggregate of different mutually causal 
factors that are in constant flux and temporary. The six internal sense bases 
(organs) and their six external sense bases (objects) are called the twelve sense 
bases and, combined with the six forms of consciousness, they are called the 
eighteen elements (dhatu). When the physical factors are taken into consideration, 
every mental procedure can be described as an entirely specific combination of 
these elements among themselves and with the perception and will phenomena 
they cause. The key result of this Buddhist analysis is that by means of this thus 
restructured and constantly changing causal structure, the illusion of a "self" that 
witnesses all these events is created that does not correspond to anything in 
reality since this self is also only the result of a process that is constantly 
                                                 
11 For a more detailed description, see Étienne Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism (Leuven: 
Peeters Publishers, 1988). 
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beginning and ending. Thus the notion of a personal soul or a lasting identity, for 
instance, of the baby growing to become an adult or even the dead person, is 
refuted. On the one hand, reconstructing, i.e., interpreting, such convictions as 
the results of psychophysical causal relationships provides a way to explain the 
development of an individualistic self-concept. In addition, we also see why a 
key factor for human suffering is seen in this view of self: In the causal nexus 
mentioned above, it causes selfish attitudes and resultant actions, which lead to 
negative karma, which yet again results in rebirth. 
The question concerning what can be understood by "rebirth" if there is no 
"soul" with lasting identity is the most-discussed philosophical question of 
Buddhist metaphysics. The perhaps most descriptive and most concise answer, 
which will have to suffice here, is a parable from the non-canonical text 
Milindapanha in which an Indian Buddhist monk explains the theory to one of 
the Greek governors installed in Northern India by Alexander the Great in 4th 
century BC: Rebirth without a soul is like the flame of an oil wick, which was 
ignited with the flame of another oil wick; the second flame is not identical to the 
first, but was created as a function of the first and continues on when the first is 
extinguished. Though, we can admit that there is some causal nexus between the 
first and the second flame, we do not have plausible arguments to defend the idea 
that both flames are identical. Buddhism declares Hinduism's belief in an 
immortal self (atman) an expression of psychologically deeply rooted human 
selfishness: Out of ignorance, fear, weakness, and desire, man develops the idea 
of atman to find consolation.12 Considering itself partially a critical reform 
movement, from early on, Buddhism aimed to destroy the psychological roots of 
these kinds of metaphysical beliefs. However, whatever the discrepancies 
between Hindu and Buddhist theories might have been, it is noteworthy that for 
most of the time before the British education system was introduced to India, 
                                                 
12 See Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (rev. and expanded ed. with texts from suttas and 
dhammapada) (New York: Grove, 1974). 
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both traditions put the topic of the "self" and its meaning at the center of the 
academic training at their schools and universities.13 
The Self and the "Other" 
Compared to Hindu self-theory, Buddhist theory gives much greater 
importance to compassion, that is, the realization that other beings are also 
suffering and the motivation to free all beings from suffering. How can this 
attitude towards others be explained by the different self-theory? 
According to the Hindu conception of self, it is the ignorant and selfish, that 
is, immoral individual himself who will be punished with another life and new 
suffering. Therefore, one can interpret the misery and the suffering of another 
being as his own fault. The idea that any existence and any biography reflects 
cosmic justice is one of the main reasons why the caste system has managed to 
survive the millennia, why even most low-caste Hindus even today accept their 
caste status, and why there has never been a collective rebellion of the lower 
castes against the system. Though I do not intend to say that in practice Hindus 
do not show compassion for the misery of others, it is still interesting to see that, 
at least on a theoretical level, Hinduism has a more distant attitude towards the 
suffering of others that follows from the Hindu conviction that each individual 
forges his own destiny. 
According to the orthodox Buddhist conception, however, there is no 
identity between the producer of bad karma and the being that results from it. If 
one is accumulating bad karma, one is causing suffering for another being. In 
                                                 
13 See Pradeep Chakkarath, "Internationalizing Education and the Social Sciences: Reflections on 
the Indian Context," in M. Kuhn & D. Weidemann (eds.), Internationalization of the Social 
Sciences: Asia – Latin America – Middle East – Africa – Eurasia (Bielefeld, Germany: 
Transcript, 2010), pp. 87-114; Hartmut Scharfe, Education in ancient India, in Handbook of 
Oriental Studies 2, Vol. 16 (Leiden: Brill, 2002). 
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other words, I am not sinning against me myself, but rather I am responsible for 
the creation and suffering of an existence which itself is innocent. Therefore, the 
karma-related guilt I am feeling is different from the guilt experienced by a 
Hindu. Consequently, all Buddhist believers should show compassion for 
everything that suffers because everything that suffers is suffering innocently. 
The concept of the non-self (anatman) might therefore also have influenced 
Buddhism's rejection of the caste system because against the background of the 
Buddhist self-theory, membership to a certain caste could not be justified by 
personal guilt. Moreover, according to this point of view, the caste system does 
not reflect justice, but adds to injustice and the miserable situation of the lowest 
castes. Therefore, one needs to show compassion for those who suffer from 
caste-related misery. 
For Hindus, however, their caste is an important aspect of their belief system 
and their socialization context. First, according to the orthodox understanding, 
you can only become a Hindu by birth, that is, you cannot be a Hindu without 
being born into a caste. Second, for most of the last three thousand years, the 
caste system has been a system of endogamous and hereditary social groups with 
their own economic as well as ritual privileges and limitations, transferred by 
inheritance from generation to generation. Therefore, third, the caste status of an 
individual reflects a biography not of a single biological life but of numerous 
transmigrations and reincarnations. Taken together, all these aspects constitute an 
essential part of a Hindu's identity. Of course, within this identity web, the 
concept of the "other" plays an important and specific role because, without the 
relative stability of the cast differentiations, an important source of a Hindu's 
identity would be lost. Interestingly, this system requires you to see the majority 
of your fellow Hindus as "others," some of them even as "untouchable others." 
This is interesting because, within the caste system, the social and emotional 
distance between Hindus of upper and lower castes can be much greater than that 
between Hindus and non-Hindus or between Indians and non-Indians who do not 
belong to the caste system at all. In other words, being "the other" in the Hindu 
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belief system is not only essential for Hindus' identity formation, it even seems to 
be a stronger criterion of exclusion when it takes place in the relationship with 
other "others." 
Thus, while the Hindu conception of the self constitutes this peculiar 
interrelationship between members of the same belief and social system, it shares 
the openness towards non-Indians with Buddhism. To conclude this article, I will 
briefly address three examples of how the Indian self-theories and their 
conceptions of the "other" presented above may have affected historical and 
socio-political aspects of Indian and Asian history. 
The first example refers to the Indian culture's influence on Eastern parts of 
Asia.14 For over a millennium, starting in around the 3rd century BC, the process 
known as "Indianization"15 brought central elements of Indian world views, 
social philosophy, government and administration, art (especially literature, 
sculpture, and architecture), scientific knowledge, handicrafts, communication 
and business styles mainly to Southeast Asia. India also has a long history of 
cultural exchange with East Asia. Trade with East Asia via the Silk Road and 
Indian ports like Calicut stretches back two millennia as can be seen in records of 
extensive early trade networks that the Kushan Empire built with China. 
Especially through the Buddhist mission and the exchange of Chinese scholars 
with the once famous Indian universities, e.g., Nalanda and Takshashila, Indian 
philosophical and scientific thought had a lasting influence on East Asia while 
East Asian culture also left its traces on the Indian subcontinent. This once 
flourishing exchange continued until the British rule over India began in the 18th 
century, ending India's role as an independent actor within the broader Asian 
scenario and using it as a political and military tool within the empire's rivalry 
with other colonial forces in the Southeast and East Asian region. Within our 
                                                 
14 See Hermann Kulke & Dietmar Rothermund, A History of India (Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2004, 
4th ed.). 
15 Ibid. 
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context of consideration, the process of Indianization is especially remarkable 
when it comes to the Hindu influence because it brought education and 
knowledge that were restricted to a very few high-ranking castes within the 
Indian culture to societies in which there was no caste system and where this 
privileged, partially even secret knowledge was made open to larger groups of 
especially Southeast Asian populations. It is worth mentioning that – except for 
the island of Bali – the century-long involvement of Hinduism did not result in a 
lasting establishment of the Hindu social system in non-Indian societies outside 
India. One of the reasons – that also explains why, historically, Buddhism had a 
more profound impact on Asia's East – might have been that it proved to be quite 
difficult to export a societal system based on membership by birth. Here, we can 
say that the other Asians outside India were just not as relevant for the identity 
formation of Hindus as were the other fellow Hindus in India itself. Thus is thus 
an example of how sophisticated and differentiated culturally developed self-
concepts can affect individual and collective interactions within one's own and 
within other societies. 
The second example refers to India's attitude towards its experiences with 
colonialism. The question concerning what role the colonial past plays for the 
Indian present has always been related to India's history and culture as a whole 
because Indian history has seen many colonizers (e.g., Aryans, Greeks, Romans, 
Muslim dynasties, Portuguese, French, Dutch, and British) and various forms of 
colonization. It was especially in the nineteenth century that Indian historians, 
based on India's influence in Eastern parts of Asia, developed the theory of 
"Greater India" which portraits the country as being an imperialistic power 
itself.16 There is no question that British hauteur and racism towards Indians had 
a negative effect on the Indian "psyche" or what one may call the "Indian 
identity." Nonetheless and especially as compared to the traumatizing effect 
colonialism had on many African nations, within India as a whole, coping with 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
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the colonial past has always been complex and largely free of bitterness.17 This 
can be explained by the similarity of key elements of the British and the Hindu 
attitudes that, against the background of the preceding paragraphs, can be 
identified as central aspects of the Hindu conception of the self and the other: the 
conviction that they rank amongst a very few high civilizations in world history; 
a far-reaching societal role of status, hierarchy, and authority, including the idea 
that status comes with birth; the attitude of superiority towards others, even 
fellow nationals, which many Indians shared because they considered it an 
expression of cosmic and natural order. We can conclude that the British decision 
not to challenge India's caste system ensured that it was able to continue to serve 
as a primary source of identity for most of its members. Thus, from an Indian 
point of view, British colonialism has never been able to break the backbone of 
Indian self-understanding. This is an important reason why – when compared to 
African nations, for example – despite two centuries of British rule in India, Indian 
scholars and politicians seem to have a relatively relaxed attitude towards the 
experience of colonialism. Psychologically speaking, coping processes are much 
easier when a person's or a collective's self-concept remains stable enough to 
provide the grounds for further development. 
My third and final example will show the relatedness of self-theories to 
historical and sociopolitical processes. It concerns the recent discussion about 
India's identity and in how far Indian, or more specifically Hindu and Buddhist, 
theories about "self" and "other" contributed to a portrayal of Indian history that, 
according to supporters of current Hindu nationalism, needs to be rewritten. One 
of the main assertions in this discussion is that the history of Islam in India is 
mainly characterized by cruelty and soaked in the blood of millions of Hindus. 
Some lament that Indian political leaders and intellectuals, including Mahatma 
                                                 
17 See Pradeep Chakkarath, "Internationalizing Education and the Social Sciences: Reflections on 
the Indian Context," in M. Kuhn & D. Weidemann (eds.), Internationalization of the Social 
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Gandhi and Nehru, have continuously tried to sweep the Islamic rage against 
Hinduism and other religious groups (whose members Islam regarded as infidels) 
under the carpet of history. For example, Gandhi's program of Indian "self-rule" 
is seen as a reflection of the Hindu and Buddhist idea that as long as everyone 
controls the psychological processes that otherwise produce anger and hatred, 
nothing – not even the rage of cruel occupiers – can harm you.18 For Hindu 
fundamentalists, the problem culminates in the question about whether a Muslim 
who supports the crimes committed against non-Muslim Indians over centuries 
and thereby shows disrespect for exactly that tradition of thinking that enabled 
the success of the attackers in first place can be considered an Indian. Though, 
these kinds of historical assessments tend to sweep the historically outstanding 
success of Gandhi's indigenous liberation strategy under the carpet of history, 
too, they still show how central the topic of self and other can be in currently 
highly controversial discussions about individual and collective identity.19 
Analyzing the current political situation in India, Pollock stated that the 
symbolic meaning system of a political culture is constructed. 20  He also 
expressed hope that improving our knowledge about these construction processes 
may help us to understand and even to control them. It is a well-founded social 
psychological insight that individuals and societies alike want to be known and 
conceived of by others in accordance with their self-concepts, i.e. their firm 
convictions and feelings about themselves. At the same time, the divergent views 
of others may decisively influence these self-verification processes that vice 
versa affect processes not only on the individual but also on the collective level. I 
hope that my remarks in this article draw more attention to the fact that 
                                                 
18 For an example of these kinds of historical analyses, see such different authors like Will Durant, 
The Case for India (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1930), and François Gautier, Rewriting 
Indian History (New Delhi, India: India Research Press, 2003, 2nd ed.). 
19 See also Michael F. Mascolo & Sunil Bhatia, "The Dynamic Construction of Culture, Self, and 
Social Relations," Psychology & Developing Societies, 14 (2002), pp. 55-89; Amartya Sen, The 
Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture, and Identity (London, UK: Penguin 
Books, 2005). 
20 See Sheldon Pollock, "Ramayana and Political Imagination in India," Journal of Asian Studies, 
52 (1996), p. 264. 
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attempting to understand how others view the "self" and the "other" is not just a 
matter of respectability, tolerance, and scientific integrity, but also a way of 
learning about the other and from the other. It was no coincidence that the topic 
of learning about the self was at the center of formalized education in Indian 
schools and universities. The fact that this topic is not considered an important 
part of academic training anymore may be just another reminder that, in order to 
assess our development as mankind, we need to look back as well as forward.♦ 
                                                 
♦ Responsible editor: Yeh-ming Chin (金葉明). 
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